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Prohibition Plebiscites on the Prairies: (Not-So) Direct Legislation and Liquor Control in 
Alberta, 1915 to 1932 
Sarah E Hamill 
This is the author accepted version of an article which was published in (2015) 33:2 Law and 
History Review 377.  Please refer to the published version. 
Abstract 
During the early twentieth century social reformers succeeded in securing a number of political 
and social reforms in both the United States and Canada.  Chief among these reforms were direct 
democracy and prohibition.  While the fate of the latter has been well-studied in both countries, 
the fate of the former, particularly in Canada, has been largely overlooked.  In this article I seek 
to fill this gap by examining the Canadian province of Alberta’s experiences with direct 
democracy and its links with liquor control.  While Alberta’s Direct Legislation Act offered the 
public a way to express their views, the government remained in control of whether or not the 
petitioned for plebiscite would actually come to pass.  I argue that the provincial government 
twice manipulated direct legislation in order to receive the result it wanted.  By examining how 
the government actually handled petitions under the Direct Legislation Act, I show that the 
measure fell far short of its stipulated goal of returning power to the people.  In fact direct 
legislation allowed the government to appear to defer to public opinion on the divisive liquor 
question and thus allowed the government to disguise its desire to have legal liquor sales. 
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Since its introduction into North America in the late nineteenth century, direct democracy, 
particularly in the form of direct legislation, has periodically piqued the interest of legal 
scholars.1  A handful of studies have examined the history of direct legislation in the United 
States and in Canada,2 yet these studies often fail to examine how the measure was actually used.  
Brief references might be given to what initiatives the voters attempted to secure via direct 
legislation,3 but the actual mechanics of the vote, questions such as what did the ballot say and so 
on, are typically overlooked.   
This article seeks to remedy this gap through the example of the Canadian province of 
Alberta and its experiences with direct legislation.  Alberta was one of the only Canadian 
provinces with a valid Direct Legislation Act,4 though its use appears to have been limited to 
votes about liquor control.5 Within a decade of its arrival in 1913, Albertans had used the Direct 
Legislation Act to hold two province-wide liquor plebiscites: the first in 1915 which introduced 
prohibition; and the second in 1923 which ended prohibition. 
It is not surprising that prohibition and direct legislation should be so linked in Alberta. 
These two reforms resulted from the activities of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century 
reform movements which were active in the United States and Canada,6 and both were 
particularly popular with the western farmer movement. Although prohibition in both Canada 
and the U.S. emerged after much local-level activism on the part of temperance activists, Canada 
did not supplement this local-level activism with federal legislation as extensive as that seen in 
the U.S.  While the U.S. introduced a constitutional amendment and federal legislation 
enshrining prohibition, Canadian prohibition legislation was largely limited to the provincial 
level, typically after a popular vote on the matter.7  Granted, there was federal legislation which 
allowed for local option votes in Canada but these ‘dry areas’ were piecemeal and often 
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ineffective by themselves.  The Canadian federal government did eventually pass some national 
legislation which restricted the inter-provincial liquor trade but this legislation only applied to 
provinces already under prohibition.8  As such, prohibition remained a much more local-level 
policy in Canada than in the U.S. and it might appear as though the measure arrived and ended 
solely as the result of popular action.  Such an observation would seem particularly applicable to 
Alberta with its Direct Legislation Act; however, this article argues that the government 
manipulated direct legislation, particularly in the prohibition abolition vote, in order to secure the 
liquor laws it wanted.   
Direct legislation was, of course, vulnerable to such manipulation.  In the U.S., Nathaniel 
Persily notes that “[w]hat began as tools for the majority to liberate its democratic institutions 
from the clutches of a few powerful corporations” became “a bludgeon used by interest groups to 
thwart the legislative process.”9  Similarly, it was equally open for governments to use direct 
legislation to advance their own ends.10 By examining how Alberta’s Direct Legislation Act was 
used this article demonstrates that it became another political tool and was anything but direct 
democracy. In fact, Alberta’s government used direct legislation to disguise its own desire to 
have government liquor sales instead of prohibition.  First, the government used direct legislation 
to maintain its pro-prohibition stance while facilitating a vote over its end. Then, several years 
after prohibition ended, the government alleged that the Direct Legislation Act was too vague for 
it to act on a pro-prohibition petition presented under the Act.  Instead of engaging with the many 
benefits of liquor sales, the Direct Legislation Act allowed the government to avoid this debate 
and make it seem as though government liquor sales only existed because of public demand 
instead of government need. 
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This article begins with the background to direct legislation and prohibition in Alberta, 
including Alberta’s 1915 prohibition plebiscite.  Then it moves on to explore the other actual or 
attempted plebiscites under the Direct Legislation Act.  The second plebiscite, which ended 
prohibition, was in 1923, and the third was the attempt to secure a further liquor vote in 1931.  
During this time period, Alberta had a further liquor plebiscite in 1920 but as that vote centred on 
federal measures, I do not examine it here.11  I explore each plebiscite in turn as well as their 
relationship with the ongoing debates around liquor control and argue that the government was 
able to use direct legislation to avoid coming out in favour of legal liquor sales.  I conclude that 
in Alberta direct legislation was not as direct as it seemed and that the government had multiple 
ways to ignore or manipulate attempts to utilize direct legislation.  
 
Background to Direct Legislation and Prohibition in Alberta 
The basic idea behind direct legislation was and is that it allows for a set percentage of the 
electorate to petition for a vote, or sometimes a piece of legislation, on any issue that they so 
choose.12 At its heart the turn-of-the-twentieth-century push for direct legislation was a reaction 
against the increasing power of corporations, industry, and other special interest groups.13  
Reformers hoped that direct legislation would allow a rebalancing of political power or, at the 
very least, check the power of special interest groups.  Furthermore, direct legislation offered 
reformers a way to force certain divisive issues such as universal suffrage and prohibition. 
During the early twentieth century, direct legislation was most closely associated with the 
American Progressive movement and was more popular in the Western U.S. than the Eastern.14   
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The political concerns which made direct legislation so attractive to the American 
Progressive movement15 proved easily transferable to Western Canada, particularly Alberta, at 
the turn of the twentieth century.  Alberta’s receptiveness to the ideas of the American 
Progressive movement was no doubt enhanced by the large number of Americans who came 
north to homestead in Alberta.16  In 1909, Alberta’s farmers came together under the name of the 
United Farmers of Alberta (U.F.A.).  The U.F.A.’s initial set of Directors were mostly American 
and these new arrivals to the province were “frustrated by high freight prices, boxcar shortages, 
unfair treatment by grain companies, high protective tariffs, and high interest rates.”17 The 
U.F.A. hoped to advocate against these injustices and win a fairer deal for its members.  
The U.F.A.’s activism was not, however, limited to agricultural concerns.  Though the 
U.F.A. would not enter politics officially until 1919, it championed a range of reforms including 
prohibition, universal suffrage, and direct legislation.18  The mouthpiece of the Canadian Prairie 
farm movement, The Grain Growers’ Guide, published numerous articles detailing the many 
benefits of these reforms.19 An article published in 1910, for example, argued that under direct 
legislation “[e]conomy, justice and purity will go hand in hand.  Ring-rule and class-legislation 
will die.”20  There seemed to be little criticism of direct legislation anywhere in Alberta and 
politicians from all parties claimed to support the measure.21  In 1912 the Edmonton Bulletin 
reported that the legislature had received numerous petitions calling for direct legislation and, as 
a result, the legislature recommended that the government should undertake an inquiry into the 
possibility of introducing direct legislation.22  
While it is not clear that the petitions calling for direct legislation emerged solely out of 
the U.F.A.’s activism, the group’s political influence was clear.  The Bulletin called the first 
legislative session of 1913 the “Farmers’ Session” and noted the links between the U.F.A.’s 
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legislative committee and the government.23  Perhaps as a way to curry support among the 
U.F.A.’s members, Alberta’s Liberal government introduced the Direct Legislation Act before 
the provincial general election took place in April 1913.24 The U.F.A.’s influence was further 
reflected in the Liberal Party’s election platform of 1913, which strongly echoed the U.F.A.’s 
own resolutions.25   
The Direct Legislation Act was relatively short with only twenty-five sections.  The Act 
allowed Albertans to propose pieces of legislation for the legislature to enact, but only if the 
proposed Acts were accompanied by a petition signed by at least twenty percent of the electoral 
roll.  The Act required that the petition’s signatures come from at least eighty-five percent of the 
province’s electoral districts, and the signatures in each district should equal eight percent of the 
votes polled in the last election.26 If the legislature did not enact the proposed Act before the end 
of the legislative session, it would then be put to a provincial plebiscite.27 If the electorate 
approved the proposed Act it did not automatically become law, it still had to be passed by the 
legislature but the Act implied that the legislature was all but bound to do so.28 The Act, in 
common with the various direct legislation acts in the U.S.,29 contained significant hurdles to 
geographically specific petitions. That is to say, direct legislation measures sought to prevent one 
section of a state or province from dominating the rest. The requirement of a geographic spread 
of voters as well as a minimum number of voters aimed to prevent petitions for frivolous 
legislation. 
Though the U.F.A. had convinced Alberta’s Liberal government to enact direct 
legislation, the group had less success with their other initiatives.  Prohibition, in particular, had 
become an issue that Canadian governments preferred to sidestep.   As the temperance 
movement gained strength in Canada the question of liquor controls became a politically divisive 
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topic.  In common with the situation in the United States, temperance was more popular with 
certain groups in Canada.30  While Francophone inhabitants of Canada tended to be opposed to 
prohibition,31 Anglophone groups, particularly middle and upper-class Protestants, tended to be 
strongly in favour of it.32   
By the turn of the twentieth century, Canadian governments had offered some 
concessions in an attempt to placate the temperance movement.  The first concession was local 
option votes which allowed localities to vote themselves dry.  Local option areas first appeared 
in the Province of Canada in 1864 and, following Confederation in 1867, the federal government 
incorporated local option provisions into the Scott Act of 1878.33  Such local option areas tended 
to fail given the ease with which liquor could be bought elsewhere and then consumed in the 
‘dry’ region.  The second major concession from the federal government was the appointment of 
the Royal Commission on the Liquor Traffic in 1892.34 Craig Heron describes this Commission 
as an attempt “to bury the [liquor] issue,”35 which suggests the federal government did not 
strongly support prohibition but felt the need to provide some response to temperance activists. 
Not surprisingly the Commission’s final report recommended nothing more than stricter controls 
and rejected total prohibition.36  In 1898 the federal government held a non-binding nation-wide 
referendum on the liquor question, the first national referendum in Canadian history.  Although 
the results showed a slim majority in favour of prohibition, voter turnout was less than fifty 
percent, and support for prohibition varied widely across the country.  Prohibition was 
particularly unpopular in Quebec and, as a result, the government decided against any federal 
prohibition measures.37  
The federal government’s refusal to act meant that temperance activists turned to the 
provinces where the issue was equally controversial.  Not everyone approved of the kind of 
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government interference that prohibition would require.38  Perhaps more importantly, though the 
argument was never explicitly made, liquor sales, particularly in Alberta, actually offered certain 
benefits to the provinces.  While the Prohibitionists focused on the detrimental effects of the 
saloon-the drunkenness, the violence, the gambling, the sexual immorality, and the destruction of 
the family39-they tended to overlook how liquor sales kept Alberta’s hotels in business by 
providing a source of profit more reliable than the room trade. As a consequence of hotel’s 
dependence on liquor sales, Alberta’s liquor licenses also functioned as a way of regulating 
provincial hotels.  The pre-prohibition liquor laws contained detailed provisions about what 
services a hotel had to offer before it could be licensed.40  Such requirements suggest that liquor 
sales had an economic role to play; one which the province could ill afford to lose, given the role 
that hotels played in the development of pioneer regions by offering somewhere for newcomers 
to stay among other things.41  The unspoken necessity of liquor sales along with the controversial 
nature of prohibition may explain why Alberta’s government failed to introduce prohibition as a 
matter of policy. With the introduction of the Direct Legislation Act in 1913, however, Alberta’s 
Prohibitionists had the tools to force the issue.42 
In October 1914, Alberta’s temperance activists presented their prohibition petition to the 
government.43  The petition was signed by 23,000 people -- which exceeded the numbers 
required under the Act.44  Within a week of receiving the petition, the government announced 
that there would be a liquor plebiscite in June 1915.45   This vote was a simple for or against 
prohibition vote which saw prohibition win by 58, 295 votes to 37,509 votes.46  At least seventy 
percent of the electorate voted in the 1915 plebiscite which seems to suggest a decisive victory 
for prohibition.  
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When Alberta voted for prohibition in 1915, it was not the first province to introduce the 
measure; Prince Edward Island had had prohibition since 1901.47  Alberta’s 1915 vote for 
prohibition formed part of a broader pattern across Canada during the First World War which 
saw all remaining ‘wet’ provinces except Quebec introduce prohibition.48  Such a situation has 
led scholars to conclude that the First World War played a key role in convincing Canadians to 
vote for prohibition.  The consensus is that the war justified an increased level of government 
interference in daily life, or that war made Prohibitionists’ efficiency arguments all the more 
attractive.49  Whether the war was decisive in the result of Alberta’s 1915 liquor vote or not, 
what is certain is that the province’s Prohibitionists would have sought such a vote with or 
without the war.   
Despite the existence of wartime conditions there were those Albertans who opposed 
prohibition on the grounds of its illiberal nature.  Early in 1915 the Blairmore Enterprise 
reprinted an article by Rev. P. Gavin Duffy who alleged that prohibition would not solve the 
liquor problem and that singling out “the distillery, the brewery, the inn and the saloon alone as 
the great cause of moral defection” was a “gross injustice.”50  Later that year an article in the 
Strathmore Standard argued that prohibition contradicted “British fair play” because it “places 
the public in the position of perpetual suspected criminals, throwing on the accused in every case 
the onus of proving himself innocent.”51  Prohibitionists answered these alleged infringements of 
personal liberties by arguing that some intrusion on personal liberties was necessary in society 
and that such encroachments were the result of an advancing civilization.52  
Another common argument against Prohibition was that it would not actually prohibit 
liquor because people would continue to drink regardless of the law.  The fact people had 
continued to drink in other areas under prohibition, notably the late-nineteenth-century 
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prohibition period in the North-West Territories,53 and in so-called ‘dry’ towns under local 
option,54 lent support to the idea that people would ignore the law.  The Prohibitionists, however, 
clung to the belief that “decent m[e]n” would not break the law and that individuals would obey 
prohibition even if they personally opposed it.55  As prohibition progressed it became clear that 
many people seemed to take delight in violating the Liquor Act which, as I now move on to 
show, caused significant political difficulties for the government. 
 
1923: Vote for Liquor 
By the time Albertans voted to end prohibition in 1923 the Liquor Act and the Direct Legislation 
Act had faced a number of challenges both to their validity and viability. Often the validity of 
both Acts was linked because if the Direct Legislation Act was invalid then so too was the 
Liquor Act which had only became law because of direct legislation. The question about the 
validity of the Direct Legislation Act came to a head in 1919 when the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council declared Manitoba’s version of direct legislation to be ultra vires the province.56 
Rather than mount an explicit defence of its own legislation, Alberta used a court case which 
challenged the validity of the Liquor Act to also prove, as far as possible, the validity of the 
Direct Legislation Act.57  Meanwhile challenges to the viability of both Acts were more 
indirectly linked with prohibitionists who, in the hope of keeping the Liquor Act in force, 
claimed that the province could not afford another liquor plebiscite;58 while those opposed to 
prohibition sought to use direct legislation in order to introduce better liquor laws.59    
In this section I argue that, as a result of the difficulties faced by the Liquor Act, as well 
as by the province more broadly, the government wanted an end to prohibition. Yet, due to the 
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continuing controversy surrounding liquor controls, the government did not want to end 
prohibition by itself. The Direct Legislation Act offered a way for the government to disguise its 
own desire to end prohibition and paint itself as merely following the public will. In order to 
make the argument about the government’s desire to end prohibition without being associated 
with its end, this section is split into two sub-sections.  The first examines the problems Alberta 
faced with prohibition, particularly those problems that resulted from what the Liquor Act did 
and did not allow for.  The second examines why the provincial government waited for a petition 
under the Direct Legislation Act instead of repealing prohibition as a matter of policy even 
though it knew prohibition was increasingly unpopular and unworkable. 
 
 The Act that Direct Legislation Made 
Alberta’s Liquor Act did not introduce total prohibition.  The Act allowed for a number of 
exceptions such as the manufacture of liquor,60 inter-provincial import and export, and liquor 
needed for mechanical, scientific, medicinal, or sacramental purposes.61  The first two exceptions 
existed because it was beyond the power of Alberta, as a province, to prohibit them.  After a few 
years, Alberta and the other provinces under prohibition succeeded in securing the necessary 
federal cooperation to shut down the inter-provincial liquor trade.62 The other exceptions 
remained, however, and created significant problems in prohibition enforcement and in 
convincing the public that the measure was being enforced.  
In Alberta, as in other places, individuals sought to use the medicinal exception to access 
liquor for non-medicinal purposes.63  Both doctors and drug stores stood accused of bootlegging 
or freely selling liquor in violation of the Liquor Act. 64  The Alberta Provincial Police (A.P.P.) 
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did not completely agree with the popular belief that drug stores were all bootlegging.  Granted, 
the police thought that the drug stores in Edmonton and Calgary were the source of much illicit 
liquor but they felt that drug stores elsewhere in the province were well behaved.65  In 1919 
A.P.P. Superintendent Bryan thought, “that in a great many of the complaints [of prohibition 
violations] coming from these small places regarding infractions of the Liquor Act, the liquor has 
been sold legally through drug stores.”66  That being said, Bryan was surprised at the sheer 
amount of liquor being sold.  Similarly, in February 1920, Attorney General Boyle blamed 
prohibition violations on medicinal liquor though he admitted that his department could do little 
to stop these violations.67  
Yet for all the talk of medicinal liquor being out of control, Alberta actually had 
prohibition’s medicinal exception under a greater degree of control than seen elsewhere.68  The 
province succeeded in limiting the number of liquor prescriptions available and this went some 
way to reducing the amount of liquor available for abuse. Nonetheless the medicinal exception 
continued to be viewed as the source of much illicit liquor. Though not all ‘medicinal’ liquor was 
used improperly, the criticism directed towards it highlighted the difference between what people 
thought prohibition meant and what it actually allowed for.  It seems clear that many Albertans 
expected total prohibition, yet the Liquor Act did not and could not offer that.69  The ‘illicit’ 
liquor sales reported to the police by many Albertans may well have been legal but they looked 
like violations and fuelled the perception that the police were not enforcing prohibition. As Mrs 
D. Fowler of Innisfree, Alberta put it when she complained about liquor violations in her town, 
“[i]t is terrible, just think we have prohibition, yet strong drink is prevalent almost 
everywhere.”70 
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The idea that the police failed to enforce prohibition emerged almost simultaneously with 
the introduction of the Liquor Act.  Within four months of prohibition coming into force A.W. 
Coone of the Alberta Temperance and Moral Reform League (later the Alberta Social Service 
League) alleged that the Liquor Act was not being properly enforced.71  Coone’s accusations of 
non-enforcement continued as prohibition progressed and in 1918 they forced Superintendent 
A.E.C. McDonnell of the A.P.P. to defend his men and their prohibition record in the Edmonton 
Bulletin.72  Coone had attacked the A.P.P. privately, in letters to the government demanding to 
know what was being done with the ‘information’ he provided, and in public through letters and 
articles in the press.73  McDonnell’s letter to the Bulletin laid out the convictions his force had 
secured in order to show that there had been an increase in both convictions and severity of 
sentences imposed.  McDonnell further accused Coone of working against the A.P.P. and 
providing “very vague” information to the police in respect of prohibition violations.74  
In 1920 it was the turn of Attorney General John Boyle to publicly defend his 
department’s administration of the Liquor Act.75  Boyle claimed that Alberta’s Act was the best 
enforced prohibition measure anywhere in Canada, though he also laid out the continued 
difficulties the police faced in enforcement.  Boyle blamed prohibition violations on the sale of 
medicinal liquor, illicit distillation on the part of the province’s large Ukrainian community, and 
the non-cooperation of the Inland Revenue department in seizing stills. Though Boyle’s speech 
attempted to portray prohibition as a workable and enforceable Act, it highlighted the many 
failures of the measure and the province’s inability to address them. Boyle himself thought that 
sixty percent of the population violated prohibition,76 and the sheer number of convictions his 
department secured--in 1919 alone the Attorney General’s department secured over 2,000 
convictions under the Liquor Act and seized 175 stills77--likely fed the perception of widespread 
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violations.  While it is probable that many of the seized stills were intended for small-scale 
personal use rather than large moonshining operations, such numbers implied that illicit liquor 
was a serious problem in Alberta.   Doubtless bootlegged liquor was a problem in Alberta but 
this problem was exacerbated by sensationalized press reports.78 As such, even with the high 
number of convictions, the government seemed unable to reverse the popular belief that 
prohibition enforcement was failing. 
The enforcement problems of prohibition enforcement were no secret, nor were they 
limited to Alberta.  Other jurisdictions under prohibition faced similar enforcement issues, 
including the difficulty of combating the perception of widespread violations.79  In Alberta, even 
prohibition’s supporters referenced the enforcement issues. In 1919, for example, Louise C. 
McKinney, President of Alberta’s W.C.T.U., boasted that prohibition had made men “moral by 
law” while noting the difficulties of prohibition enforcement.80  Four years later she would attack 
the Moderationists--a group opposed to prohibition--for claiming that prohibition was 
unenforceable while simultaneously attacking those citizens who ignored prohibition.81 
  Within a few years of its introduction, it was clear that the Liquor Act could not deliver 
what Prohibitionists had promised it would.  The effects of the Act were not, however, limited to 
liquor sales and consumption.  The abolition of public bars had resulted in a sharp decline in 
provincial hotel accommodation which, in turn, hurt the province’s many developing areas. 82 
The abolition of licensed bars also removed the de facto hotel regulation that had existed under 
the pre-prohibition liquor laws.  It was not that hotel owners were able to resist hotel regulation; 
it was just that the province never replaced the regulation seen under the pre-prohibition liquor 
laws despite calls from temperance activists for them to do so.83 Hotel owners were not the only 
ones who lost money during prohibition; the government also lost out on a significant amount of 
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revenue that could have been made from legal liquor sales.  For example, the Attorney General’s 
department estimated that, including illicit sales, the liquor profits for 1920 totalled eight million 
dollars.84  
 By 1921, Alberta was in the midst of an agricultural and economic crisis and desperately 
needed new sources of revenue.85  Liquor profits offered one way out of the province’s financial 
issues but liquor remained a politically divisive topic and the government seemed unwilling to 
contemplate ending prohibition as a matter of policy.  Fortunately for the government those 
opposed to prohibition had begun to organize and they hoped to use the Direct Legislation Act to 
end prohibition.   
 
The Fight for a Plebiscite to End Prohibition 
The Moderation League of Alberta formed in 1919 after over a hundred people attended a 
meeting in Edmonton to protest the Liquor Act and its enforcement.86  Not long after their 
founding the League adopted the tactics of the Prohibitionists and circulated a petition, hoping to 
use the Direct Legislation Act to secure another liquor plebiscite.  In an obvious attempt to 
secure a plebiscite simultaneously with the 1921 provincial general election, the Moderation 
League presented their petition to the provincial legislature in March 1921.  The then Liberal 
government rejected the petition as invalid, citing concerns over some of the signatures.87  
 The rejection was not necessarily all bad news for the Moderation League.  Alberta’s 
Premier Charles Stewart referenced British Columbia’s recent decision to end prohibition and 
said that it would “be watched with interest by the citizens of Alberta.”  He also claimed that 
Alberta’s recently “improved and strengthened” Liquor Act would “offer a fair comparison” to 
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British Columbia’s “experiment with the sale of liquor for beverage purposes.”88 All of which 
suggested that the League should try again at a later date when the government might be more 
amenable. 
In the 1921 provincial election, however, the staunchly prohibitionist U.F.A. swept the 
Liberal party from office.  The U.F.A. had entered politics two years earlier as a result of its 
members’ frustrations with the existing political parties;89 frustrations which had only intensified 
due to the farming crisis which had gripped the south-eastern part of the province since the end 
of the First World War.90  Although the U.F.A.’s focus was on the farmers, the party remained 
committed to prohibition: not long after assuming office the new Attorney General John 
Brownlee vowed to make “drastic changes” to the liquor laws in order to ensure that prohibition 
was finally enforced.91   
At the same time as Brownlee made these promises, British Columbia began to reap the 
financial benefits of its post-prohibition system.92 Meanwhile Alberta’s serious financial 
difficulties continued,93  leaving the province in need of new sources of revenue.  Liquor profits 
were one potential source of new revenue and within two years of the U.F.A.’s election the 
provincial press freely speculated that the government was considering liquor sales as a way of 
boosting the provincial treasury.94  
There were, however, two main roadblocks to the U.F.A. ending prohibition.  The first 
was the fact that the party claimed to support prohibition.  Prior to taking office the U.F.A., in 
common with other Prohibitionists, blamed the failure of prohibition on government inaction.  
Once in office, the blame shifted to the U.F.A. for not doing enough to enforce the Liquor Act 
which soon forced Brownlee to defend his government’s prohibition record.  He argued that “for 
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some time, people have been learning how to evade the present Liquor Act and we are now 
getting the full benefit of their experience.”95   Yet less than two years later Brownlee tacitly 
admitted defeat over the issue of prohibition enforcement.  In a 1923 letter to H.H. Cragg of the 
Alberta Social Service Council, Brownlee wrote “[w]hen I first assumed office I felt, as many 
others do, that by increasing the penalties and providing gaol sentence a better enforcement of 
the Act would result. It may have come to your notice that a year ago the Ontario Legislature 
reduced the penalties under the Liquor Act, having come to the conclusion that the increased 
penalties did not result in a better enforcement of the Act.” 96   
Though made in a roundabout way, Brownlee’s point was that the stricter and harsher 
enforcement demanded by temperance activists was not enough to improve the effectiveness of 
prohibition. While Brownlee never explicitly said prohibition was unenforceable, the message 
was clear, as outside of stricter enforcement there were few other ideas on how to make 
prohibition effective.  Given his party’s Prohibitionist outlook, Brownlee could not advocate for 
an end to prohibition as a matter of policy.  Happily for the government, the actions of the 
Moderation League in 1921 offered a way around this first roadblock, as a petition under the 
Direct Legislation Act could end prohibition without the government’s explicit support.  
The Direct Legislation Act and, more specifically, its constitutionality, formed the second 
roadblock to prohibition’s end in Alberta.  While direct legislation was relatively uncontroversial 
in the U.S., the same cannot be said for Canada.  The most contentious version of direct 
legislation in Canada was Manitoba’s Initiative and Referendum Act.97 As in Alberta, 
Manitoba’s version of direct legislation resulted from an election promise of the provincial 
Liberal party.98  However, unlike Alberta, Manitoba immediately referred its Act to the courts to 
test its validity. The resulting case was eventually appealed to the Privy Council which held that 
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because Manitoba’s Act interfered with the powers of the Lieutenant-Governor it violated 
section 92(1) of the British North America Act and was thus ultra vires.99 
By the time the Privy Council ruled Manitoba’s Act as ultra vires the province, Alberta’s 
Direct Legislation Act had been in force for six years.  Not only did the decision in Re Initiative 
and Referendum Act throw Alberta’s Act into doubt, it also cast doubt on the validity of the 
province’s Liquor Act.  Based on the case files of J. McKinley Cameron, a Calgary criminal 
defence lawyer, it seemed to be a common practice among lawyers to challenge convictions 
under the Liquor Act on the grounds that the Act itself was ultra vires as a result of how it had 
been enacted.100  The courts may have always sidestepped Cameron’s claims about the legality 
of the Liquor Act but the constitutionality of this Act and, by extension, the Direct Legislation 
Act needed to be settled before any further plebiscite could be held.   
By the time the U.F.A. came to office, Alberta had a case winding its way through the 
courts which would confirm the validity of the Liquor Act: Nat Bell Liquors. Nat Bell Liquors 
was not just a case about the validity of the province’s Liquor Act and by extension its Direct 
Legislation Act, it also touched on key issues of enforcement. In August 1921 S.B. Woods, the 
lawyer who acted for the government said Alberta needed to appeal the decision of the Alberta 
Supreme Court because “the majority decision ... will make it extremely difficult indeed for the 
Liquor act of the Province to be enforced with any approach to satisfaction.”101  While these 
issues of enforcement may explain why the provincial government pursued the appeal, the 
chance to settle the constitutionality of the Liquor Act was perhaps equally important.  
At the Privy Council Nat Bell Liquors argued that the Liquor Act was “ultra vires, 
because even if related to matters named in Section 92 of the British North America Act, 
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regarding which a provincial legislature is “exclusively” empowered to make laws, still it was 
not “exclusively” made by the Legislature but partly also by the people of Alberta.”102  Nat Bell 
also argued that the Direct Legislation Act was itself ultra vires because “it altered the scheme of 
legislation laid down ... by the British North America Act.”103 The Privy Council seemed to 
sidestep the issue raised by Manitoba’s Act noting that a “law is made by the provincial 
legislature when it has been passed in accordance with the regular procedure and has received 
the Royal Assent duly signified by the Lieutenant-Governor on behalf of His Majesty. Such was 
the case with the Act in question.”104  Nat Bell could not convince the Privy Council that the 
Direct Legislation Act interfered with the “discharge of the functions of the legislature and of its 
component parts” though Lord Sumner also observed that the validity of the Direct Legislation 
Act was not “directly raised” and there was “no utility” in deciding it.105  That being said, the 
Privy Council did find the Liquor Act to be intra vires and seemed to give its tacit approval to the 
validity of Alberta’s Direct Legislation Act. The decision in Nat Bell Liquors meant that by the 
end of 1922 Alberta’s Moderationists could try once again attempt to secure a liquor plebiscite 
under the Direct Legislation Act.   
The second time around, however, the newly formed Alberta Hotelmen’s Association 
(A.H.A.) spearheaded the efforts to secure a plebiscite.  The A.H.A. formed in June 1922 with 
the goal of securing “legitimate concessions that will benefit the hotel business of Alberta.” 106  
Initially the A.H.A. claimed that it was not interested in liquor licenses,107 yet by October 1922 
the A.H.A. had put together a draft act which would allow their members to sell beer.108 It is not 
clear what prompted the A.H.A.’s change of opinion, but the association had been founded with 
a view to address the decline in hotel accommodation,109 and, at the time, there was an emerging 
consensus across Canada that beer sales would help with this issue. Two months after the A.H.A. 
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formed, for example, the commission investigating the hotel situation in Ontario reported that 
Ontario’s hotelmen believed that beer sales were the only solution to the problems facing 
hotels.110  Regardless of how the A.H.A.’s apparent change of direction came about, it used its 
draft act as the basis for the petition which it presented to the legislature early in 1923 with the 
goal of securing a liquor plebiscite under the Direct Legislation Act. 
While the petition and plebiscite that secured prohibition in 1915 were straightforward, 
the 1923 petition and plebiscite were anything but.  Initially the 1923 petition looked like it 
would fail as its supporters could not find an M.L.A. to sponsor it in the legislature.111  The 
petition had to be, as the Edmonton Bulletin put it, “dragged into the Legislature by [Premier] 
Greenfield.”112  Once the petition was introduced, the legislature voted to accept it by forty-nine 
votes to seven, despite some concerns over the validity of certain signatures.113  Notably the 
accusations of invalid signatures came from leading temperance activists, including Nellie 
McClung, M.L.A.114  It is perhaps not surprising that temperance activists would claim that the 
petition was invalid as they wanted to avoid a further liquor plebiscite. What was unexpected, at 
least to Alberta’s temperance activists, was that the supposedly pro-prohibition U.F.A. 
unquestioningly accepted the petition.  
As the province readied itself for another liquor plebiscite the government’s next two 
moves cast suspicion over its claims to be pro-prohibition.  First, in the same month as the 
government accepted the Moderationists’ petition as valid, it also made moves to strip urban 
drug stores of the right to dispense prescription liquor.115  Government officials made some 
comments about urban drugstores being particularly problematic in respect of prohibition 
enforcement, but such claims were long-standing.116  There were also complaints made by 
druggists themselves about having to deal with the “liquor trade.”117  Certainly the idea to 
22 
 
remove liquor sales from drug stores had been around for a while, and even pre-dated the U.F.A. 
government.118  The timing of the government’s decision over urban drug stores could have been 
simply coincidental, but it had the potential to be viewed as a distraction from the government’s 
actions over prohibition’s future.  Perhaps ironically, the decision to limit liquor sales to the 
government vendors in Edmonton and Calgary left the government open to attacks from 
opposition members, with opposition leader and former Attorney General John Boyle asking if 
the government would be advertising its new stock.119  The government’s actions over drug 
stores may have been an attempt to bring liquor under more control but it also appeared to be 
setting up a government liquor sales system.  
Secondly, in April of 1923, one month after approving the liquor petition as valid, the 
government amended the Direct Legislation Act.120 These amendments to the Act allowed for 
any vote taken under the Act to use the single transferable vote-thus allowing voters to rank their 
choices instead of picking only one.121  The transferable vote system emerged out of the mid-
nineteenth century work of Thomas Hare who hoped such a system would remedy some of the 
“most serious ... evils to which democracy is subject.”122  Hare’s system sought to avoid the 
problem of gerrymandering and to “achieve a numerically accurate, or proportional, 
representation of the electorate.”123  Such attempts to deliver a fairer political system fit well 
with the goals of the progressive movement in both Canada and the U.S.  Not surprisingly, the 
U.F.A. had lobbied for the transferable vote before entering office.124 
The U.F.A.’s decision to introduce the transferable vote could be seen as evidence of the 
party returning to its reformist roots; but, once again, the timing of its introduction left the 
U.F.A.’s motivations open to attack.  Within a few months of its election, the U.F.A. had come 
under some criticism for its failure to reform the provincial election system as it had promised to 
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do.  In February 1922, Robert Pearson M.L.A. noted that the government had said nothing about 
its pledge to introduce proportional representation.125  There were some rumours that the 
government would be acting soon on the matter, but until 1923 there were few concrete 
developments.  The lack of action should hardly be surprising, as few governments can introduce 
their entire platform immediately. While the U.F.A. eventually introduced a mixed system of 
proportional representation and preferential voting for all provincial elections,126 the transferable 
vote’s first trial in the 1923 liquor plebiscite caused controversy because it seemed to be what the 
government wanted rather than the people.  Almost as soon as the government introduced the 
liquor petition the press reported that “[i]t is well known that some of the ministers as well as 
many of the private members on the government side want a preferential plebiscite on the liquor 
question this year.”127 Even if the government did want a preferential liquor plebiscite, the Direct 
Legislation Act did not, in its 1923 form, allow for such a vote.   
The difficulty over ensuring a preferential vote initially left the government unsure of 
how to proceed.  First, Premier Greenfield suggested that alternative proposals should be 
submitted at the same time as the liquor plebiscite,128 and then he suggested that the legislature 
either adopt the proposed Act as it was – the Direct Legislation Act allowing for proposed acts to 
be passed by the legislature without a plebiscite – or include a preferential ballot in the vote.129 
This apparent lack of policy on the government’s part left it open to criticism from opposition 
M.L.A.s,130 and from the press, with the Edmonton Bulletin claiming that the government had 
lost much prestige.131  The government eventually opted to amend the Direct Legislation Act to 
allow a preferential ballot, though this too attracted ample criticism.  Boyle even accused the 
government of attempting to destroy the Direct Legislation Act with its amendments which 
allowed the government to “load up the ballot with all kinds of other questions” not asked by the 
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people.132 Despite the controversy surrounding the 1923 amendments to the Direct Legislation 
Act, they passed and became law in April of that year.133 
A few days before the amendments passed Brownlee declared his support for prohibition 
but noted that “if the majority of the people in the province wanted government control of liquor 
there was nothing to do but give it to them.”134 Such comments suggest that the government 
expected prohibition to be voted out.  Other government officials had already hinted at similar 
sentiments. In March 1922, almost a year before Alberta even approved a liquor plebiscite, the 
Deputy Attorney General of Alberta, A.G. Browning, had written to the Chairman of the 
Saskatchewan Liquor Commission about prohibition in Alberta.  Browning noted that the U.F.A. 
government was attempting to devise “ways and means” to make prohibition effective but that 
“if failure results it will not be for lack of intention.”  Tellingly, Browning also said that if 
prohibition should fail “legislation along other lines may have to be considered.”135  A year later 
Attorney General Brownlee wrote a letter addressing U.F.A. member W.H. Erant’s claim that 
people were voting for an end to prohibition because it was “not carried out....[everyone] want[s] 
prohibition, but not with the police and doctors bootlegging and the Bars wide open.”136  
Brownlee’s reply to Erant stated that he hoped prohibition would continue and that if it did “the 
Government will continue exactly as it has in the past, using every effort within reason to 
enforce the Act with such means as are available at present.” 137 Granted such comments seem 
like a practical compromise but Brownlee also chastised Albertans for failing to realize that 
proper prohibition enforcement required popular support. Brownlee asserted that whatever form 
of liquor laws existed there would always be infractions.138  He refused to make the public 
statement that Erant wanted, namely that the government would make sure prohibition would be 
enforced if people voted for it.  Brownlee pointed out that such a comment would imply that the 
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government was “not doing everything in its power at the present time to enforce the present 
Act.”139  Reading Brownlee’s letter it is clear he was frustrated with the current state of 
prohibition enforcement and the criticisms the government received because of prohibition’s 
apparent non-enforcement.  As much as Brownlee wanted prohibition, what he really wanted 
was a workable system of liquor control; though, given the U.F.A.’s commitment to temperance, 
Brownlee could not be candid on the issue. 
As 1923 progressed the government continued to act in a way that suggested it wanted an 
end to prohibition.  Following the amendments to the Direct Legislation Act, the government 
designed what Heron calls an “unusual” four-choice ballot.140 The four-choice ballot might be 
explained by Alberta’s wrangling over its Direct Legislation Act but it was not what the A.H.A. 
had expected when it presented its petition.  More importantly it made Alberta’s 1923 liquor 
plebiscite an outlier among other Canadian liquor plebiscites of this period.  Typically liquor 
plebiscites only had two choices: for or against liquor.  Alberta’s 1923 liquor plebiscite, 
however, allowed Albertan voters to rank the following choices in order of preference: Clause A-
prohibition; Clause B-sale of beer in licensed premises; Clause C-government sale of beer with 
hard liquors available via prescription; Clause D-government sale of all liquor and sale of beer 
on licensed premises.141  It should be noted that three of these choices allowed for some kind of 
government sale of liquor and that the ballot did not offer any stronger form of prohibition other 
than the status quo. Crucially, as Boyle had earlier pointed out, the public had not asked for all 
the choices that the government included on the ballot,142 which suggested that the government 
had altered the ballot for its own ends. 
While Alberta’s Prohibitionists urged voters to “plump” for prohibition and not rank any 
of the other choices, Premier Greenfield urged the opposite.143  The government claimed that it 
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wanted a full range of opinion on the issue and that the transferable vote would enable this.  
Further, the government also claimed that choice was essential to democracy and so Albertans 
must learn to exercise their choice through transferable votes.144  Yet, ranking the choices would 
potentially allow the government to show that there was widespread support for government 
control.   Furthermore, if prohibition should be voted out, Alberta’s preferential ballot offered an 
additional benefit: the need for only one liquor plebiscite.  Manitoba also ended prohibition in 
1923 but while Alberta had one plebiscite, Manitoba had two plebiscites within a month: the first 
on government liquor stores, the second on whether to allow the sale of beer by the glass.145 
Plebiscites were expensive; in fact, Alberta’s Prohibitionists had tried to argue that the province 
could not afford the $250,000 it would cost to hold the 1923 liquor plebiscite.146  Given Alberta’s 
financial difficulties and the belief that prohibition would be voted out, a preferential ballot 
promised to save on costs while allowing the government to delegate the decision over the exact 
shape of liquor controls to the public. 
On 5 November 1923, fifty-eight percent of Albertans who voted in the liquor plebiscite 
chose Clause D: government sale of all liquors and sale of beer on licensed premises.147  Perhaps 
ironically Alberta’s government did not need to rely on the mechanisms of the single transferable 
vote to gain a mandate to end prohibition; Clause D had enough first choice votes to win 
outright.  The results meant that Alberta became the fourth province to repeal prohibition, joining 
Quebec, British Columbia and Manitoba, and became only the second province after Quebec to 
return to public drinking.148 
Just as Prohibitionists had used direct legislation to win prohibition so too did those 
opposed to prohibition use direct legislation to end it.  Yet in Alberta, the vote against 
prohibition was not as clear as the vote for prohibition had been.  The provincial government’s 
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tinkering with direct legislation pointed to some of the weaknesses of such forms of direct 
democracy.  Direct legislation may have seemed as though it returned power to the people but 
the 1923 liquor vote cast doubts on such ideas.  The weaknesses of direct legislation in Alberta 
would become clearer as the Prohibitionists attempted to use direct democracy to force a return 
to prohibition.  
 
1931: No Vote 
Not surprisingly Alberta’s Prohibitionists were deeply disappointed with the results of the 1923 
liquor plebiscite.  At the 1924 Annual Meeting of Alberta’s W.C.T.U., President Louise C. 
McKinney lamented the return of liquor.  She blamed prohibition’s failure on a lack of 
enforcement and she wondered if perhaps Alberta was not yet Christian enough for 
prohibition.149  Such despondency could not last.  The Prohibitionists prided themselves on being 
people of action and they soon found a way to explain the end of prohibition.  Given the unusual 
four choice liquor ballot, Alberta’s Prohibitionists came to believe that they had been cheated 
rather than defeated.  Within two years of the 1923 plebiscite, H.H. Hull of the Alberta 
Prohibition Association wrote to the government to demand a straight vote on the liquor issue.150  
Rather than agitating for a return to complete prohibition, Alberta’s Prohibitionists targeted the 
hotel beer parlours; a campaign which culminated in an anti-beer parlour petition in 1931.  The 
government refused to act on this petition and so the Prohibitionists failed to secure the vote they 
wanted.  By this time liquor sales had become essential to the government but, for political 
reasons, the government could not admit to that and so, as this section shows, the government 
again manipulated the Direct Legislation Act to disguise its own desire for legal liquor sales. 
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In 1926, Nellie McClung, an M.L.A. and temperance activist, attempted to secure a 
liquor plebiscite simultaneously with the 1926 provincial election.  She argued that the public 
had not understood what Clause D meant and so Alberta needed another vote.  Somewhat 
embarrassingly for McClung she struggled to get enough support in the legislature to get her 
motion even discussed.  Not surprisingly her motion was roundly defeated, with Premier 
Brownlee describing another liquor vote as “premature.”  Brownlee went on to claim that the 
public’s opinion of the beer parlours had not yet crystallized and that this was the reason his 
government was not interested in another liquor plebiscite.  When the Lethbridge Herald 
reported McClung’s attempted plebiscite, the paper noted that there was “[l]oud feminine hand 
clapping from the galleries” whenever she spoke.151  Such a report hints that prohibition 
sentiment was not as popular as it once had been and represents a gentle mocking of the 
Prohibitionists.  It also suggests a sexist attitude towards Prohibitionists and that prohibition was 
seen as a women’s issue.  Either way prohibition did not seem to be gaining in popularity.  
Brownlee’s comments about another liquor plebiscite could be read as playing for time.  
He did not want to openly support the new system, particularly the beer parlours, but nor could 
he afford for the new system to fail.  The cost of setting up a system of government liquor 
control was considerable in terms of stock and, of course the 1923 plebiscite had required 
significant expense.152  While government liquor control had proven profitable, with the 
A.L.C.B. reporting profits of over $1 million in its first year,153 Alberta’s finances as a whole 
remained precarious.  In 1927, for example, the government forecast a budget deficit.154  While 
1927’s forecasted deficit may not have materialized, the financial difficulties Alberta faced 
would only be heightened with the arrival of the Great Depression two years later.  
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Brownlee attempted to prevent another liquor plebiscite by deferring to public opinion 
which is somewhat ironic given how plebiscites work.  Yet a close reading of Brownlee’s 
comments shows that he had already interpreted the public’s opinion towards the beer parlours. 
For Brownlee, the public will might be the final arbiter of the liquor laws, but he was the one 
who would interpret what the public thought and, in 1926, Brownlee declared that public opinion 
was undecided. 
The Prohibitionists’ failure to secure a plebiscite in 1926 did not deter them from their 
goals.  They spent the next few years disseminating the ‘truth’ about the beer parlours to anyone 
who would listen.  The Prohibition Association kept up a steady stream of correspondence with 
the provincial government outlining the evils of the beer parlours. The provincial W.C.T.U. also 
kept up the pressure but as the 1920s progressed, their annual reports grew thinner and fewer 
locals presented reports at the annual meeting.155 Nonetheless, Prohibitionists remained able to 
secure meetings with provincial leaders, which may well have buoyed their hopes of eventual 
success.  
In February 1929, after a meeting with Alberta’s Prohibition Association, Premier 
Brownlee declared that he expected a change to the Liquor Control Act within two years and that 
he felt Alberta was swinging back towards temperance.156  It is not clear what evidence 
Brownlee based this prediction on; if anything prohibition sentiment had been on the decline 
since 1916.  Brownlee was, of course, trying to placate the Prohibitionists who felt frustrated by 
their lack of progress.  During the February 1929 meeting Brownlee reaffirmed his personal 
support for prohibition but told the Prohibitionists “[d]on’t make the mistake of trying to rush 
this thing.”157  Following his own advice not to rush, Brownlee refused to hold any liquor 
plebiscite and refused to amend the liquor laws that year.  
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A year later Hull wrote to Brownlee to suggest that if the government were to close down 
the beer parlours, it would make more money from the sale of liquor.158  Brownlee responded 
sharply to Hull’s suggestion and said “[o]ur policy with respect to beer rooms will be determined 
solely by the extent to which we believe public opinion to have crystallized sufficiently on the 
liquor question to enable proper support to be given to any other forms of liquor legislation and 
not from the standpoint of our Provincial revenue.”159Again, Brownlee claimed deference to 
public opinion and promised nothing. 
Alberta’s Prohibitionists, however, were determined and by the end of 1930 they were 
circulating another liquor petition with the hope of securing a vote on the beer parlours.160  In 
February 1931, two years after Brownlee had predicted a return to temperance, the 
Prohibitionists presented their anti-beer parlour petition to the legislature.161  Such a result was 
the exact opposite of what Brownlee wanted.  He had warned the Prohibitionists in 1929 that 
provincial plebiscites were expensive and such an expense only became more crippling as the 
Depression further decreased provincial revenues.  Even the liquor revenues suffered as a result 
of the Depression. In February 1931 the Lethbridge Herald noted that the A.L.C.B.’s profits had 
declined even though the number of liquor permits had increased.162  Later that year Brownlee 
admitted that the decline in liquor profits was one of the main reasons provincial revenues had 
fallen.163   
Brownlee may have repeatedly denied that the government had any interest in liquor 
revenues but the facts suggest otherwise.  Between 1926 and 1929, for example, the government 
received monthly updates on the board’s accounts.  These reports supply little information except 
how much profit the A.L.C.B. made and if it represented a decrease from the previous year.164  
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The need for such constant reporting of the A.L.C.B.’s profits suggests that the government 
relied on liquor revenues in a way that it was not willing to admit publicly. 
Hull was, however, right about one thing when it came to the provincial liquor revenues: 
the hotel beer parlours contributed a smaller proportion of the profits.  The economic role of the 
hotel beer parlours was not to provide revenue for the provincial treasury; rather the hotel beer 
parlours worked to ensure adequate hotel accommodation throughout Alberta.  During the inter-
war period, Alberta was a developing province and still had a number of small settlements 
struggling to develop.  Hotels were a crucial part of any nascent settlement as they offered a 
place for newcomers to stay while they searched for alternative accommodation.165  They also 
offered affordable lodging for transient labour and travelling salesmen, with many hotels 
offering sample rooms where salesmen could set up their wares for display.166  The profits from 
the beer parlours funded the hotels which were so essential to the economic and social 
development of pioneer regions.  Anything which jeopardized the beer parlours, threatened the 
other services hotels offered and, as such, had the potential to damage the economy more 
broadly. 
In 1930, as the Prohibitionists circulated their anti-beer hall petition,167 the A.H.A. 
reminded Albertans that hotels represented millions of dollars of investment.168  That same year, 
the A.L.C.B.’s Sixth Annual report made a point of referencing the controversy surrounding beer 
parlours.  Importantly the report noted that rural hotels had suffered a decline in business and 
therefore a decline in criticism.  The A.L.C.B. also went out of its way to reference the quality of 
Alberta’s hotels and claimed that “the hotel accommodation available here is equal, if not 
superior, to the accommodation available elsewhere in Canada.” Furthermore, the report praised 
the A.H.A. for cooperating “in every way...to keep the hotel business on as high a plane as 
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possible.”169  Though the A.L.C.B. did not explicitly say that beer licenses were needed to 
maintain these standards, the message was clear.170    
In addition to the economic importance of hotel beer parlours, they had also proven 
crucial to the control aspects of Alberta’s post-prohibition system.  One of the reasons that the 
neighbouring province of British Columbia introduced beer parlours in 1925, four years after 
introducing liquor stores, was because liquors stores did not offer enough control over how 
individuals consumed liquor.171  Though hotel beer parlours were far from perfect at shaping the 
consumption patterns of their patrons they did a better job than liquor stores.  Crucially, beer 
parlours made a legal form of alcohol instantly available in almost every settlement in Alberta 
which went some way to combating illicit sources of liquor. 
Given the various benefits of hotel beer parlours, the centrality of liquor revenue to 
Alberta, and the province’s own precarious financial situation, the government had no intention 
of acting on the 1931 liquor petition.  The government could not simply ignore the petition or 
declare it as invalid under the Direct Legislation Act, as the Prohibitionists would likely just try 
again. Nor was the government willing to publicly defend its liquor laws as this would have 
conflicted with their claim to support prohibition.  What the government needed was a way to 
simultaneously invalidate the petition and the Direct Legislation Act as this would give them a 
legal justification for ignoring the petition while avoiding accusations that they were pro-liquor.   
As with all petitions under the Direct Legislation Act, the government announced that it 
would be sent to a committee of the legislature so that its validity could be decided.  It was here 
that the petition first ran into trouble with Liberal M.L.A.s refusing to join such a committee 
because it was too much work.172 Eventually the petition was referred to the private bills 
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committee of the legislature but to give the committee more time the government amended the 
Direct Legislation Act to allow it to report during the next session if necessary.173  The 
amendments also allowed the government to refer to the courts questions of law over whether or 
not any petition submitted under the Act was actually valid,174 which could be read as an attempt 
to forestall any difficulties with the petition.  In 1932 the committee reported that it had some 
doubts over certain signatures on the petition and so declared it invalid.  The committee also 
ruled that the vagueness of the Direct Legislation Act left it open to attack in the courts.  Due to 
this weakness in the Act, the committee stated that the government should take the petition as an 
expression of opinion and did not need to hold a plebiscite.175  Thus not only did the committee 
invalidate the 1931 petition, and sidestep the requirement for a plebiscite, they effectively 
rendered the Direct Legislation Act null and void.  From then on, the Albertan public would be 
unable to force a provincial plebiscite unless the government wanted one.   
Just as the government had used the Direct Legislation Act to end prohibition, they used 
the same Act, though in a different way, to avoid changing the Liquor Control Act. Yet 
Brownlee continued to publicly deny that he or his government were defending the liquor laws.  
Understandably, Alberta’s Prohibitionists were outraged by the government’s refusal to act on 
their petition and some wrote to the government to complain.  In June 1932 Brownlee personally 
responded to the complaint of Mrs Gaines of Barrhead.  Once again Brownlee denied that he was 
interested in revenue, noting that the beer parlours provided “very little” money to the 
government.  Brownlee told her that as it was the province could barely afford to keep schools 
open, so spending almost $200,000 on a plebiscite was impossible.  Brownlee asserted that, due 
to the Depression, people’s minds were “so disturbed that it is difficult to get a fair expression of 
opinion on any question” and as such any plebiscite would be pointless.  Finally he suggested 
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that as liquor sales had decreased liquor abuse must also have decreased.176  As compelling as all 
of these reasons may have been, given Alberta’s dire financial situation and the U.F.A.’s own 
commitment to prohibition, the government needed to find a justification, ideally one grounded 
in law, for their refusal to act on the 1931 petition.  The alleged vagueness of the Direct 
Legislation Act allowed the government to justify its failure to act on the petition without 
admitting to the necessity of legal liquor sales. The Act’s vagueness also removed the potential 
for any other plebiscites and left the government in charge of major changes to the liquor laws.  
The government rendered the Direct Legislation Act toothless in 1931 but did not repeal 
it until 1958.177 In 1958, according to Boyer, the then Attorney General claimed that the Direct 
Legislation Act was ultra vires based on the Privy Council’s decision on Manitoba’s act.178  Such 
a claim was dubious as Nat Bell Liquors strongly suggested that Alberta’s Direct Legislation Act 
was constitutional.179  Arguably the 1958 repeal of the Direct Legislation Act was nothing more 
than a formality as no further petitions were presented under the Act after the failure of the 1931 
liquor petition.180 
The fate of the 1931 petition illustrates the ease with which direct legislation could be 
ignored by the government.  Though Alberta’s Direct Legislation Act appeared to surrender 
some control to the population, the government retained a large say in whether or not any 
petition would actually be considered valid under the Act.  That being said, the government’s 
success in sidestepping the 1931 petition was helped by the fact that the 1931 petition 
represented a minority view.  Those who signed the 1931 petition later claimed that they were 
made fun of and their businesses boycotted when their names were made public.181  It is 
impossible to know how the government would have reacted had the petition had broader 
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support, but it clearly did not appreciate the potential for direct legislation to upset government 
policy. 
 
Conclusion 
The fate of direct legislation in Alberta was closely tied with prohibition and as prohibition 
revealed itself to be unviable so too did direct legislation.  Ironically, just as prohibition seemed 
to result in the exact opposite of the prosperous, law-abiding, temperate society that it promised, 
so too did direct legislation, at least in Alberta, seem to produce the opposite of direct 
democracy.  Alberta’s first experience with direct legislation was the 1915 liquor plebiscite and, 
while this vote was uncontroversial, the province’s remaining experiences with direct legislation 
were not.  Taken together the 1923 liquor plebiscite and the failed liquor petition of 1931, 
illustrate the ways in which the government and not the people retained control over direct 
legislation.  It was for the government to declare any petition as valid under the Direct 
Legislation Act, and it was the government who designed the ballot.  
Canada’s experience with direct legislation differed significantly from that seen in the 
United States.  While in both countries, it was mainly the western regions who adopted the 
measure, direct legislation faced less opposition in the United States than in Canada.  Writing in 
the 1960s Stephen Scott seemed slightly perplexed about Alberta and Manitoba’s decision to 
enact or attempt to enact some form of direct legislation given the constitutional limitations on 
provinces’ lawmaking powers.182  Canada’s constitution meant that Canadian direct legislation 
was different than that seen in the United States because there was no way that a plebiscite could 
force a bill’s enactment in Canada.   Consequently, Canadian versions of direct legislation, if 
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they were to be constitutional, had to be less radical than their counterparts in the United States.  
Even if Alberta’s politicians had wanted to enact a measure which would have given the people 
the power to enact legislation, they could not have done so without a constitutional amendment.  
It is perhaps ironic that the group who campaigned for direct legislation, the U.F.A., were 
the ones who oversaw its demise.  The U.F.A. entered politics because they thought they could 
do a better job than the existing parties and perhaps because the Direct Legislation Act had not 
proven as useful or as transformative as its supporters had hoped.183  During its early years 
Alberta was a poor province which could ill-afford endless plebiscites and these financial 
restraints may have acted as a dampener on the overuse of the Direct Legislation Act.  Certainly 
financial objections to the Act’s use were raised both in 1923 and in 1931.184  Furthermore, the 
province’s sparse settlement patterns likely made acquiring the requisite number and geographic 
spread of signatures a significant challenge.   
Alberta’s direct legislation experiment highlights the importance of examining how direct 
legislation was actually used.  Previous studies of the measure, both in the United States and 
Canada, have focused on the high level political battles to get direct legislation enacted and 
whether or not any legislation was passed under it.  By studying the mechanics of the measure 
and how the government and public sought to use it, I have shown that direct legislation was 
perhaps not so direct after all.  
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